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Abstract: Understanding the nature of linguistic representations undoubtedly will 
benefit from multiple types of evidence, including structural priming. Here, we argue 
that successfully gaining linguistic insights from structural priming requires us to 
better understand (1) the precise mappings between linguistic input and 
comprehenders’ syntactic knowledge; and (2) the role of cognitive faculties such as 
memory and attention in structural priming.  
 
 
Branigan and Pickering provide a strong argument that structural priming (and 
priming paradigms more generally) may provide a useful avenue to better understand 
the nature of linguistic representations. We wholeheartedly agree that structural 
priming can yield useful insights about individuals’ underlying linguistic 
representations. However, just as insights from metalinguistic acceptability 
judgments require us to understand how these judgments are made, insights from 
priming paradigms require us to understand the processes underlying structural 
priming – specifically, how priming can be influenced by online processing and 
cognitive constraints.  
To understand structural priming, we first need to understand the precise 
mappings between linguistic input (prime sentences) and comprehenders’ syntactic 
knowledge. There is now considerable evidence that comprehenders’ parses do not 
always reflect the input veridically. Instead, parses reflect comprehenders’ recent 
experiences, prior beliefs, and predictions of upcoming linguistic material (review: 
Traxler 2014). Critically, these factors not only influence sentence interpretation, but 
also influence syntactic parses themselves. An important question, then, is “What 
aspects of the parsing process influence patterns of structural priming?”  
On one hand, there is evidence that structural priming reflects 
comprehenders’ eventual parses, which may be the result of correction or 
reconstruction of the original linguistic input. For example, structural priming can 
occur from isolated verbs: Verbs that occur only, or mostly, in one construction can 
prime that construction (Melinger & Dobel 2005). However, counterintuitively, 
structural priming also can occur from sentences with missing verbs (e.g., The waitress 
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the book to the monk), and such priming has a similar magnitude to priming from well-
formed primes (e.g., The waitress gives the book to the monk; Ivanova et al. 2017). These 
data suggest that comprehenders can reconstruct missing verb categories as well as 
missing post-verbal syntactic constituents, and these reconstructed representations 
give rise to priming effects. Structural priming even can reflect apparent corrections 
of parses that would result in implausible scenarios. That is, after implausible double-
object datives such as The waitress gave the book the monk, speakers can be primed to 
produce prepositional datives and not double objects as might be expected based on a 
syntactic analysis alone (Slevc & Momma 2015). These data suggest that non-
syntactic factors such as plausibility can influence a comprehender’s final parse, thus 
changing or even reversing expected patterns of structural priming. Crucially, in all 
three examples, priming effects appear to reflect listeners’ final parses rather than the 
structure of the original input.  
On the other hand, structural priming can reflect intermediate aspects of 
parsing, such as erroneous abandoned partial analyses, instead of, or in addition to, 
the intended and presumably eventual parse. For example, an incomplete sentence 
fragment that is subsequently corrected to another syntactic structure still can 
produce structural priming. That is, speakers were more likely to describe a picture 
with a prepositional dative after hearing a sentence fragment that started as a 
prepositional dative but was corrected to a transitive (e.g., The mechanic is giving the 
new part... uh... is recognizing the new part) than after a fragment starting as a double-
object dative and corrected to a transitive (Slevc & Ferreira 2013). Similarly, 
participants completed more sentences as transitives after temporarily ambiguous 
sentences such as While the man was visiting the children who were surprisingly pleasant 
and funny played outside than after identical sentences disambiguated by a comma (van 
Gompel et al. 2006). Importantly, the priming effects observed in these studies 
reflected temporarily suboptimal or erroneous parses that arose from the processing 
demands of online parsing.   
Of course, structural priming reflects active processing even in the absence of 
errors or temporary ambiguity. Thus, the role of underlying cognitive faculties is a 
second aspect of structural priming that deserves more investigation. One such 
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faculty is attention: Priming effects are greater when primes are directly attended 
(e.g., when a comprehender is addressed directly in a dialogue) compared to when 
she or he is not directly addressed (e.g., when a comprehender simply overhears a 
conversation). This result suggests that the depth of processing of a prime sentence 
directly affects the magnitude of priming (Branigan et al. 2007). A second relevant 
faculty is working memory. Although there is evidence that structural priming effects 
can be long lasting (e.g., Bock & Griffin 2000; Kaschak et al. 2011) and may reflect 
implicit learning rather than short-term maintenance (e.g., Chang et al. 2006), 
working memory nonetheless has been implicated in structural priming. Ivanova et 
al. (2013) found that increased working memory demands during the production of 
target picture descriptions reduced priming (at least for datives in a picture 
description paradigm; note that priming the presence/absence of the complementizer 
that in a recall paradigm was unaffected by memory load). These data suggest that 
attention and memory demands can influence priming effects, although we still 
know very little about these influences.   
These examples illustrate that the relationships among linguistic input, 
syntactic knowledge, and structural priming are indirect and mediated by processing 
constraints. This does not undermine the usefulness of structural priming to shed 
light on linguistic representations. It does suggest, however, that more work is 
needed to understand how specific task and stimuli details affect both parsing and 
structural priming. Of course, processing dynamics influence metalinguistic 
acceptability judgments as well (e.g., Lau & Ferreira 2005), and so it will be 
important to compare how processing demands affect these different paradigms. 
More generally, structural priming (like any method) has both advantages and 
limitations. We agree with Branigan and Pickering that it can be a useful tool to 
investigate the nature of linguistic representations, but we also caution that this tool 
still requires careful work to unpack the processes underlying our tendency to reuse 
recently experienced structure.  
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